DiplomacyNet

The uneducated, unimportant, unsolicited predictions on foreign affairs from an unqualified armchair foreign correspondent

Perfect Storm Averted...for now....

April 3, 2006

Wikipedia defines a perfect storm thus: any only-remotely-possible disastrous confluence of singly innocuous events. In other words, if any one element in a perfect storm failed occur, or occurred, but at some other point in time, the results would not be so disastrous. All in place, all at once...disaster. In the realm of Near East politics, such a storm was narrowly averted last month, and in an unexpected place.

Over the winter, my brother, father, and I were discussing what the perfect storm would look like in the Middle East. It would consist of three elements occurring more or less simultaneously: 1) the remote chance that Hamas would win the Palestinian election, 2) the likely chance that Sharon would die or be permanently incapacitated (he had just had his stroke at the time), and 3) a Likud led by Netenyahu that would win the subsequent elections in Israel.

Element One

Sharon slips into a coma. A little history here: Sharon was elected on under the Likud (right-wing) party in 2001. His platform was built around pledges to stop the violence and restore Israel's security, but violence carried on across the country for years. So Sharon, as those before him in the same role, found out that while a hard-line is desirable from an ideological standpoint, it is not realistic to winning security for your country.

Therefore, five months ago, he resigned from his Likud party, formed Kadima as a centrist party (what William Saffire in the NYT called the "big bang"), and forever changing Israel's political landscape. By forming this party, he stood a better chance of gaining support for his policy of unilateral disengagement.

Unilateral disengagement entails removing Jewish settlers from Palestinian territory, and fixing the borders of the Israeli state and Palestinian state. It is "unilateral" because up to this point, Israel has not felt that it has a negotiating partner in the Palestinians. Gaza has already been withdrawn from, with little fanfare and little violence. The West Bank, even if Fatah were in power, would be a much more arduous affair. It is, in the words of Foreign Affairs, "an area far larger and more populous, [and] in increasingly desperate straights". Kadima recognizes the risk and is willing to take that risk.

Sharon had planned to take Kadima to victory in the spring parliamentary elections. But his stroke and subsequent incapacitation came at an inopportune time. It turns out that much of Kadima's platform beyond the basics (see below) existed in his head. Even his Deputy Premier Ehud Olmert, could not clearly articulate what Kadima had in store.

Element Two

The same month that Sharon slipped into a coma, incredibly, Hamas won the majority of the Palestinian Authority Legislative Council, 74 out of 132 seats, in the January election. It was absolutely stunning to those outside the Palestinian community, given that Hamas's charter is based on the destruction of the State of Israel, and the destruction of a secular Palestinian government. It was not so stunning to the Palestinians who were more motivated by their anger of a corrupt ruling Fatah party than they were by a hatred of Israel.

But if Israel felt that it had no negotiating partner in the Palestinians before, with Hamas in control of the legislature, that notion was sealed in fact. So now you have a terrorist-playing-politics entity in power among the Palestinians, and an unclear platform for Kadima. The "Perfect Storm" is just ahead and moving in rapid motion. It will take a parting of the red seas like miracle to stop it.

Element Three

What was left now for that perfect storm to hit was a victory by the Israeli right, let by Benjamin Netanyahu. Netanyahu is a former Likud leader who strongly opposed the peace agreements established between 1993 and 1995. He is a very persuasive individual, not only to Israelis, but to American supporters of Israel as well (note: he spent his teenage years along with his college years in the US, so he knows the American mind very well).

When he himself served as Prime Minister, he learned that the hard line is the hardest to hold, and signed an accord with the Palestinians that called for Israeli withdrawals from the West Bank in return for Palestinian security guarantees. This pissed off his Likud party to no end. Further, the Palestinians violated the terms over and over again. This experience undoubtedly impacted his move further to the right.

So now with Hamas in place, and Kadima's platform ambiguous and not well fleshed out, Netanyahu and Likud were expected to win a very strong position in last month's parliamentary elections scheduled for the spring of 2006.

Averted

And then it happened. For reasons that I don't completely understand, Kadima actually grew its powe4r base after the loss of Sharon. It picked up left wing voters who had opposed Sharon in the past, and ended up winning the election (if anyone has any ideas or insights as to how this happened, I'd be interested in seeing your post).

Perhaps they won because the appeal to both right and left, just not the extremes. The right might feel that it is realistic to separate and create a fortified barrier rather than go through the futile task of negotiating with those that call for Israel's destruction (note: Hamas has not said that they would attend such negotiations. And perhaps the left might be supportive of the Kadima platform that recognizes the need for Israel to foster a separate Palestinian state. Or perhaps there are dozens of other significant factors at play.

What could have happened?

The bottom line is that a crises of enormous porportions has been averted. If you had a Likud Kinesset led by Netanyahu, and a Palestinian Authority led by Hamas, there is little likelihood that there could be anything but war. And this is not the kind of war characterized by an intifata. This would be more along the lines of a 1967 or 1973 war, where Arab nations would be forced into taking one of two position: attack Israel or stay on the sidelines.

And to take this scenario one step further, think of the nations that would leap at the chance to attack Israel: Syria and Iran, supported by Lebanon. Then what are the obligations of the US and Russia? If Iran attacks with biological weapons, and Israel responds with nuclear weapons, then what happens? There are likely dozens of such doomsday scenarios.

What will really happen?

Fortunately, this is all academic at this point. Kadima is in position, unilateral separation looks like it is gaining more and more support within Israel. If the past is any indication of the future, the UN and international community will realistically push boundaries to see if they can force Israel to deal with Hamas rationally through road maps and negotiations. Although Hamas has already said that they are unwilling to do so, history shows that Israel will take the blame.

My opinion on what should happen? Kadima should continue to push for unilateral disengagement. With Fatah in place, the risk was that pulling out of the West Bank could lead to chaos...chaos that Hamas could capitalize on. Now Hamas is in place. The risk has already occured. Now what is left is to pull out, and let the Palestinian state be built.

If it is built under a Hamas flag, treat the new nation as you would any other adversary: fortify the hell out of your borders and watch carefully who enters from that enemy nation. If some other party comes to power, one willing to recognize Israel's right to exist with security, treat that state as you would any other state upon which you depend economically.

Your thoughts?

For reference only, I reprint below the Kadima platform as it stands. This is from Haaretz:

The Israeli nation has a national and historic right to the whole of Israel. However, in order to maintain a Jewish majority, part of the Land of Israel must be given up to maintain a Jewish and democratic state.

  • Israel shall remain a Jewish state and homeland. Jewish majority in Israel will be preserved by territorial concessions to Palestinians.
  • Jerusalem and large settlement blocks in the West Bank will be kept under Israeli control.
    The Israeli national agenda to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and achieve two states for two nations will be the road map. It will be carried out in stages: dismantling terror organizations, collecting firearms, implementing security reforms in the Palestinian Authority, and preventing incitement. At the end of the process, a demilitarized Palestinian state devoid of terror will be established.
  • Israel's political system will be modified to ensure stability. One possibility to achieve this goal would be to hold primary, regional and personal elections to the Knesset and the Prime Minister's office.
  • Kadima would not rule out a future coalition partnership with any Israeli political party or person.
  • Kadima wants to see a "presidential" system, in which voters choose the prime minister and legislators on an individual basis and not as part of a party list, with Knesset members elected according to specific regions of the country.