Near East
When Negotiation Is A Misguided Policy
July 13, 2008
On Wednesday, July 16th, Israel will receive the presumed dead bodies of two soldiers kidnapped by Hezbollah. These are the bodies of the two soldiers whose capture in a cross-border raid in 2006 led to a month-long war. Israel is also said to be receiving the body parts of other captured soldiers.
In exchange, Israel will free prisoner Samir Kantar, among other terrorists. However, Kantar is not an ordinary militant, not an ordinary guerilla fighter, not an ordinary prisoner of war. He is not you’re your run-of-the-mill terrorist. Kantar is serving several life sentences for what can mildly be described as a notorious homicide.
Kantar is a member of the Palestine Liberation Front. He and his squad raided a town in northern Israel. During the raid, they killed two police officers He then burst into a family home in a beach town near the scene. There he encountered a family of 4. He lead the 28 year-old father and his 4-year old daughter out to the beach. In front of the 4-year old, Kantar shot the father.
You would think that making the child experience this horror would satisfy his thirst for blood. Not quite. Kantar proceed to knocked the child down with the butt of his rifle. He dragged her down the beach, and placed the child’s head on a rock on the beach. After struggling with her to clear her arms from her face, he, and smashed her small head in with his rifle butt. Still not happy, he stomped on her body until she was dead.
The terrified mother of the 4 year old hid with her 2 year-old daughter in a closet. While trying to muffle the child’s cries so as not to be found by Kantar and his associates, the mother accidentally smothered the child.
[As a side note: NPR left out the crimes that Kantar committed in their reporting of the story in the Bryant Park Project. NPR joins company with Islam Online who similarly omits the crime details.]
There are two questions that need answers, but clear answers are elusive. The first is why Israel would even consider trading dead bodies in exchange for the freedom of a hideous murderer? The second is why would welcome this particular person back into their community, given all the Palestinians serving sentences in Israel’s jails.
Israel has a history of making poor deals during prisoner exchanges. In 1967, Israel traded 11,000 Egyptians for 10 Israeli soldiers. In the 80’s, Israel went from negotiating unbalanced exchanges with states to unbalanced exchanges with terrorist organizations. In 1984, Israel traded 4,000 Ahmed Jibril detainees for 5 Israeli soldiers. And in 1991, Israel traded 51 living prisoners in exchange for mere proof that one of its soldiers held in Lebanon was, indeed, dead.
The logic behind such swaps is an extension on the “no man left behind” principle. Israel sees such exchanges, with all their extreme disparities, as consistent with its commitment to the members of its armed forces. Soldiers have the expectation that when in battle, they will be recovered from the battlefield dead or alive. Israel’s youth ns and daughters are compelled to serve, and this is what they ask in return.
On its face, it doesn’t seem to be too much to ask when considered on an individual basis. When the cost of return becomes usurious, and a exploitative party sits at the other end of the table, the situation becomes nothing less than offensive.
Now, the second question - why would the Palestinians want a man who so brutally tormented and killed a child back in their society - is a far easier one to answer. He is considered a hero. He has no regrets. He will be celebrated upon his return.
If there is any doubt that a people would worship this kind of savagery, note that the initial 2006 Hezbollah raid that led to the capture of the two now dead soldiers, was executed in order to use them as bargaining leverage for the release of Kantar. Therefore, Hezbollah risked (sacrificed) hundreds of their own, the very people they purport to be liberating, for the release of a single child-killer.
Further, upon his return, Hezbollah and the Palestinian people will get a battle-tested, committed fighter. Not only does he have no regrets, he has every intention to return to a life of terrorism. In a letter to the Hezbollah Secretary General, Kantar writes:
“I give you my promise and oath that my only place will be in the fighting front soaked with the sweat of your giving and with the blood of the shahids [martyrs], the dearest people, and that I will continue your way until we reach a full victory. I send my best wishes and promise of renewed loyalty to you, sir, and to all the Jihad fighters."
This is one of many decisions that the current Israeli cabinet has made in recent years that defy logic. In a reasonable world, the dead would be exchanged for the dead. Prisoners of war would be exchanged for living prisoners of war. In today’s convoluted world, we have the most notorious of monsters being exchanged for the dead.
The impact of such a misguided decision will play out over the next several years. There is little disincentive for a terrorist organization to make as many attempts as they please at abduction and slaughter. They know that in the end if Israel retaliates, Israel becomes the target of international scorn. And if they manage to strong-arm Israel to the table, she will seek only her dead in return.
Israel spent a great deal of time negotiating this exchange. In the meantime, backchannel talks with the Syrians faltered, and the Palestinian peace process has hit another impasse. All the while, the government squandered the trust and patience of the Israeli people. Israel should be negotiating with states and the Palestinian Authority. Not with stateless terrorist organizations and proxies.
The Silence That Concerns Me
February 16, 2008
When I was in high school, I remember an arms deal that caused considerable controversy at home and abroad. The administration of then President Ronald Reagan had brokered a deal that would be the largest foreign arms sale in US History: the sale of AWACS surveillance planes to Saudi Arabia. I recall strong opposition (as much as I understood it) from Congress, the American public, and Israel. It was a pretty big deal.
Fast forward 27 years later, and the United States has brokered another deal to sell arms to Saudi Arabia, this one part of an overall $20B arms package to allied Arab nations. But history is not repeating itself. Israel did not oppose the deal. The House Foreign Affairs Committee will not to consider a resolution of disapproval. And with the exception of a couple of Reps in the House, crickets.
I decided to see what the difference was this time around. I started by looking into the context to the 1981 deal, and the context of the current deal.
Reagan Era
In 1981, the Reagan administration, with Alexander Haig as Secretary of State, brokered a deal to sell a fleet of five AWACS surveillance planes as part of a strategic deal with Saudi Arabia. Many at the time felt that the U.S. sold their soul in the name of oil.
Prominent Senators considered the deal as the U.S. succumbing to oil-based blackmail by Saudi Arabia. Others wondered out loud why we would support a nation who was opposed to Middle East peace. And further, this was a time that you would expect the US not to be in a particularly giving mood. Iran had just recently turned from ally to enemy, and they were no in possession and control of American military equipment originally purchased under the Shah’s regime.
Now, Israel was obviously very concerned. For one thing, giving the Saudi Royal Air Force that kind of surveillance equipment meant that the Saudis could track any and every move by the Israeli Air Force. But beyond the military ramifications, it smacked diplomatically. Israel questioned how the country that came to their defense during the Six Day War could now arm country with whom they were still technically at war.
The Reagan administration spun the sale as a way to promote stability in the region. By that logic, the sale would actually good for Israel. And besides, sniffed both Haig and Reagan, a foreign nation should not meddle in American foreign policy. In the end, the sale went through. They bristled at the notion that oil was at the root of the sale.
Bush Era
Now examine the current deal.
During
President Bush’s tour of the Middle East, he brought with him an offer
for the Saudis to purchase
Joint
Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM).
We commonly see these weapons referred to as "smart bombs" in the
press. The idea is to send
900 precision-guided bomb kits that give the Saudi military extremely
accurate targeting capabilities.
The deal comes on top of a myriad of other recent
deals with allied Arab states in the region.
Other deals include selling Patriot missiles and early warning
systems to the militaries of Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates.
And yet, this time, Israel was silent. In fact, the deal went largely unnoticed by most Americans. Even most Democrats who (along with some Republicans and many of our European allies) challenge any foreign policy move by the president as a course of habit had little to say.
The one thing that everyone agrees upon is that Saudi Arabia's cooperation is critical to if we are going to pursue a policy of deterring aggression from Iran. There are a few reasons why you would choose to bolster Saudi Arabia in order to keep Iran in check. For one thing, Saudi Arabia is a Sunni-majority state, and Iran is a Shiite state. Both are seen as leading nations of their sects, and are something of natural enemies. For another, relations have been extremely strained since the Saudi’s backed Saddam Hussein in the Iran-Iraq war in the 80’s.
Not that the Saudis are the only Sunni state that is concerned about Iran’s growing influence. Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, etc. all have weaker militaries and all fear where this may be headed going. A Shiite-led Iraq complicates things considerably more because at the moment, the only thing keeping Iran in check is the US military presence in Iraq. And when we leave, we leave behind a void in terms of a way to contain Iran. Without the Saudis as a buffer, Iran could very well destabilize the region.
It is pretty easy to say that the Israeli’s recognize that a destabilized region is a terrible scenario for them. Their silence is likely a tacit acknowledgement that they have a common interest with their Saudi enemies.
So that leads me to this question: Could it be that the Reagan administration was seeking the same goal as the Bush administration of isolating Iran? Could they have sensed that one day, this rogue group of extremist students-turned-leaders could one day tip the delicate balance in the region, and thereby threaten our access to oil? Perhaps.
Not that I am saying that Reagan himself knew the difference between a Sunni and a Shiite. But the administration certainly would know that the Saudis were concerned. And the administration would surely would have heard loud and clear just how concerned the Saudis would be, and would understand how that might threaten our oil supply.
Whatever the case may have been then, and whatever the case may be now, it is interesting that what is not said (in this case, what is not said by Israel) speaks volumes.
Turkey In The Wings
January 2, 2008
The US may have squandered its opportunity leverage one of our most
important assets. It is an asset that could help to make headway in
tackling so many of our current challenges: peace in the Middle East,
stability in Iraq, democracy flourishing in Muslim-majority populations,
and a host of other tribulations. That asset is our relationship with
Turkey .
Turkey is a nation whose news profile seems to be forever lurking in the
shadows. It rarely makes the biggest headlines, and still it is always
there. Print space and analyst mindshare these days are consumed by
heated issues in obvious places: Pakistan, Iraq, Iran, Israel, Kenya,
etc. But there are a number of ingredients simmering in Turkey that
should give us more than pause for concern because they threaten our
relationship.
Why Turkey Is Strategic
Before I enumerate reasons for concern, it is important to understand
why Turkey is essential to the US. Turkey has, since its inception and
through the Cold War, been an ally of the United States. It is a member
of NATO, and it is a strong trading partner with a relatively strong
economy. Turkey’s geographic location and, democratic secular form of
government make it an important friend to have in a troubled region
where the US has tenuous relationships with even the best of our
friends.
All of this comes together to make Turkey strategic to the US. Let me
flesh out those reasons:
1. A Strategic Location: Located on the Black Sea to the north,
and the Mediterranean to the south, Turkey links the Middle East to
Europe. It borders Iran, Iraq, and Syria to the south, Eastern Europe to
the north. This location has many ramifications.
For one, the majority of American cargo heading to Iraq by air has to go
through Turkey. One-third of the fuel for US troops in Iraq also goes
through Turkey. C-17s fly military supplies to U.S. soldiers in Iraq all
the time so that we can avoid using Iraqi roads which are susceptible to
attacks. Who knows how many American deaths have been avoided as a
result. Turkey is also is the major hub for supplies headed to
Afghanistan.
Another factor that makes Turkey’s location is strategic an asset to the
US is that in order to avoid trouble from other countries bordering
Turkey, it must work to promote solid relations. Its geographical
location (and shared threats of Kurdish separatism) necessitates that
Turkey take positions that do not isolate it from neighbors. This gives
them diplomatic advantages that its US ally should, in theory if not in
fact, be able to share (more on this below).
Finally, they place host to an American base near the Syrian/Iraq
border. This base is important for US operations in the region.
2. A Promising Economy: Turkey is considered one of the US
Department of Commerce’s
Big Emerging Markets
countries. These are the countries that the
Department of Commerce considers exceptional opportunities for
exporters. According to the
CIA World Factbook, their 2006 GDP was $640B, representing a growth
rate of 6.1%.
These solid economic indicators are the results of an economic
transformation that has taken 10 years of commitment. That commitment
has paid off in terms of US trade. Bilateral trade has grown by
twenty-eight percent over the last five years and now totals over $6
billion.
3. Key for Diplomacy: Turkey can diplomatically reach into places
that the US cannot. Turkey maintains good relations with its neighbors
including Syria, Iran, and Lebanon.
At the same time, Turkey enjoys good relations with Israel. In fact,
Turkey was the first Muslim country to formally recognize Israel. Israel
is a major economic partner with Turkey. There is a free trade agreement
in place, and plans for a super-pipeline for water, gas, and oil trade
between the two countries. Israel is also a major supplier of arms to
the Turkish military.
Turkey has historically supported an Arab-Israeli peace process. Their
relations have cooled somewhat in the face of recent events, to be sure.
Both countries have a vested interest in a stable Middle East, a shared
interest that helps them weather the difficult times.
4. Democratic model in a Muslim-dominated region:
Turkey is a secular democracy with a Muslim population. It was founded
in 1923 on secular ideals. It has, since its founding, been a
parliamentary representative democracy with universal suffrage and a
guiding constitution. The combination of its status as a secular
democracy and its positive relations with both Israel and the Arab world
made Ankara a crucial ally for Washington. In fact, because Turkey is
democratic state with a Muslim population, it could be seen as the model
for what the Bush administration is trying to build and spread in the
Middle East.
Have We Squandered Our Opportunity?
In the time since we invaded Iraq, our currency with the Turks
has diminished considerably. Events both within and outside of Turkey
have reduced our ability to leverage a positive relationship to our
advantage. And there are signs that it is in danger of further decline.
What has happened?
1. The democratic model is threatened: Now, as mentioned above,
Turkey is a secular democracy with a Muslim majority. It is the
only Muslim democracy in the region.
Again, it is the model of what the US is trying to achieve elsewhere in
the region. However, what happens as Turkey continues down its path to
becoming less secular?
Turkey's Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul was elected by parliamentary
majority as the country's 11th president. His political background is
far less secular than his 10 predecessors. His roots are in the Islamist
political movement. Turkey is moving decisively towards Islamist
politics, and away from democratic ideals. In a Pew study described
below, Turkey had the highest percentage of respondents who disliked
American ideas about democracy (81%).
Soner Cagaptay from the Washington Institute on Near East Policy sees
the secularism that has held Turkey together and has bound them to the
west as being threatened. To quote: “the fact that Turkey has for long
maintained a thick firewall between religion and politics in the
European tradition of secularism. And that firewall, I think, is going
to become thinner and thinner. It's already actually being thinned out”.
Now there are others who point out that the Turkish Military has always
been the protector of a secular society. They have stepped in four times
in the past to protect the secular way of life and government. And the
leadership is keenly aware of the limits that are in place to keep them
from challenging the status quo too much.
Further, their continued bid to become part of the EU would be
threatened if they moved too far. Turkey can ill afford this type of
schism with the West. Despite these speed bumps, the steady move toward
an Islamist government is concerning.
2. America’s Image: Indeed, Turkey has benefited from the United
States political, economic and diplomatic support. But public opinion of
the United States within Turkey continues to precipitously decline.
Turkey has taken a decidedly anti-American turn in general. This
sentiment is not limited to our concept of democracy.
Pew Research Center does a
survey of global public opinion. The poll includes 47 countries and
their views and opinions on the United States. US image is worst in, of
all places, Turkey. That means that the US image is actually better in
places like Pakistan, the Palestinian Territories, even Venezuela, than
it is in Turkey. This follows a five-year trend of decline in Turkish
opinion.
3. The Kurdish powder-keg: Turkey’s parliament approved
cross-border military operations against the PKK (the Kurdistan Workers
Party). The PKK is a separatist/nationalist movement of Kurds operating
in areas of great importance to Turkey. Their goal is to create an
independent socialist Kurdish state (Kurdistan), in a geography that
today includes parts of southern Turkey, northern Iraq, northern Syria
and north-western Iran.
Both times that the US was involved in a military conflict in Iraq, we
courted the Kurds. This is obviously a great source of stress in US
relations between both the Kurds and the Turks. Once military victory
was achieved in Iraq, the Kurds neither got the protection and support
they expected, nor did Turkey get the security they needed. It is always
the next step after that victory that eludes us.
Perception in Turkey is that we control Northern Iraq (home to the
Kurdish population and the PKK). The perception also is that while we do
all that we can to prevent the Turks from attacking the Kurds from the
north, the same does not apply to PKK attacks well into the Turkish
border.
This has likely contributed to the Turkish parliament approving
cross-border attacks against Kurdish rebels in northern Iraq. What could
be more dangerous, more damaging, and more of a mess than we already
have, than a war between Turkey and the Kurds…on Iraqi soil?
Keep in mind that, in both wars in Iraq, we bolstered the Kurds and
implied that the rewards would be some sort of autonomy. Now, we have
compromised the security of one of our most strategic allies AND have
managed to not satisfy the Kurdish designs for autonomy.
4. Armenian Genocide: Now, the coupe de gras: At roughly the same
time that Turkey was debating whether or not to authorize attacks on the
PKK in Northern Iraq, a congressional committee passed a resolution
labeling a World War I era massacre of Armenians by the Ottoman Turks as
a genocide.
At issue is the deportation and slaughter of from 1 to 1.5 million
Armenians in the Ottoman Empire. During World War I, The Ottoman Turks
(who sided with Germany) feared that the Christian Armenians would to
ally themselves with Imperial Russia. They then used this as an excuse
to execute a “final solution” of sorts on the Armenian population. The
state-sponsored, mass killings too place during the time period of 1915
to 1923.
This is an extremely sensitive issue with the Turks, many of whom
maintain that the deaths were the result of a civil war coupled with
disease and famine, rather than a pure genocide. To be clear, you really
cannot call it anything but a genocide. It was, in fact, the first
genocide of a century of genocide.
But the timing of this recommendation could not be worse. The time to
for this resolution was when the Ottoman Empire still existed. Or any
time up until now. Or at some point later. But not at this moment in our
relationship. To recap: the Turks are a strategic ally, they can offer
diplomacy where we can’t, the Kurdish situation is a powder keg waiting
to go off, Iraq and Afghanistan are far from stabilized, etc. So we
choose now as the time to inflame historic tensions?
The bottom line here is that Turkey has the potential of providing us
with so much that we cannot provide ourselves. We have neither the
credibility in the region, the currency with the populations, nor the
standing or cultural linkages to go it alone.
Yet we never seem to fail when it comes to nurturing this key
relationship. When you take all of this together, it is surprising that
the situation in Turkey lurks in the shadows. It is only a matter of
time when this becomes the major key concern for our foreign policy. I
just do not look forward to whatever event needs to take place to make
that happen.